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ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPETITION IN
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: WHY "EXIT" WORKS
BETTER THAN "VOICE"
John C. Coffee, Jr.*

INTRODUCTION

A sizable literature on class actions has long suggested that the
plaintiffs attorney is an independent entrepreneur over whom the class
members have only limited control. 1 But the analysis cannot stop here.
Why does this state of affairs exist? This essay will give two connected
answers to this question as a prelude to evaluating what reforms are
likely to work:
(1) The rules of "litigation governance" differ diametrically from
those of corporate governance. An entrepreneur seeking capital for a
business venture must convince investors to "opt in" and buy the
securities of the entrepreneur's start-up corporation. In contrast, a
plaintiffs attorney can file a class action which, if successful, will
entitle this legal entrepreneur to a mandatory court-awarded fee, and
class members can escape inclusion only by "opting out. " 2 This stark
difference between an "opt in" rule for corporate governance and an

• John C. Coffee, Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law
School and Director of its Center on Corporate Governance.
I See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's

Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1991).
2 Actually, there is only a right to "opt out"-that is, exit the class-in the case of class actions
certified under Rule 23(b)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). If an action is instead certified
under Rule 23(b)(l) or (b)(2), Rule 23 does not mandate a right to opt out. But see Molski v.
Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the right to opt out may be
constitutionally required when class members have substantial monetary claims); Beckert v.
TPLC Holdings, Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 873-74, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has not
yet decided whether the right to opt out from a class action for money damages is of
constitutional stature. For a review of recent decisions, see Rima N. Daniels, Monetary Damages
in Mandatory Classes: When Should Opt-Out Rights Be Allowed, 57 ALA. L. REV. 499 (2005).
Because most class actions for money damages are certified under Rule 23(b)(3), this limitation
on the right to opt out in the case of Rule 23(b )( 1) and (b )(2) classes has only modest implications
and will receive no further attention herein.
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"opt out" rule for litigation governance explains, at least in part, why
agency costs are higher in the latter context.
(2) The market for class action counsel has long been characterized
by relatively weak competition. To be sure, some competition exists,
but, as explained later, it is today fought, not for the loyalty of class
members, but rather over the choice of the lead plaintiff.
Brief and incomplete as these two assertions are, they frame
important policy questions. Because the "opt out" rule for class actions
gives plaintiffs attorneys much of their bargaining leverage in class
actions, it is not easily modified or discarded. However, it also implies
imperfect accountability and high agency costs because class members
did not select their attorney, did not choose to sue, and were not
necessarily even aware of the existence of the action. Thus, the usual
vocabulary used to describe the attorney/client relationship fits only
awkwardly with this joint venture in which the attorney represents a
class that has not retained the attorney in return for a basically
predictable share of the recovery that the court (and not the class) will
award if the action settles. Still, what alternative is there? Can we
design alternative institutional arrangements that will reduce the agency
costs surrounding reliance on the attorney/entrepreneur who today
dominates class action practice? This essay's answer is that by
encouraging opt outs, public policy can stimulate greater competition
and compel class attorneys to become more faithful champions.
This focus on competition is somewhat heretical. For some time,
public policy has been guided by the implicit assumption that an allinclusive class was desirable (because it minimized repetitive litigation
and so conserved judicial resources) and that greater accountability
should be encouraged by giving dispersed class members a stronger
voice in the governance of the class action. Thus, the "lead plaintiff'
reform, introduced by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA"), assigned presumptive control over the securities class
action to the class member with the largest stake in the action. 3 The
premise here was that the investor with the largest stake in the action
could best monitor the class' attorney. Although an original and cogent
idea,4 this reform appears to have had only modest impact on settlement
3 Section 2 ID(a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3), creates
a rebuttable presumption "that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this
title is the person or group of persons that ... has the largest financial interest in the relief sought
by the class ...." Effectively, this means that an institutional investor owning a significant
number of shares purchased during the class period can take control of the action and select class
counsel-without itself even filing a complaint. For an overview, see Lisa L. Casey, Reforming
Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1239.
4 Full credit must be given to Professors Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman for crafting this
proposal. See Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053
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size to date. 5 Indeed, this essay will predict that similar efforts to give
the class members a greater role in electing or appointing a class-wide
champion will yield only similarly marginal and disappointing results.
If so, what measures might work better? Using a nomenclature
first developed by the economist Albert 0. Hirschman,6 this essay will
argue that the fallacy in recent reforms has been their emphasis on
increased "voice" for class members, instead of increasing their ability
to exit the class. The "exit" option essentially relies less on a global
agent for the class and encourages some class members to select their
own agents. To be sure, others will be unable to afford private counsel
and will be compelled to rely on class counsel. But to hold potential
"opt outs" within the class, class counsel is motivated to do more ( or
charge less). That "exit" may work better than "voice" is evidenced by
the striking disparity that has recently arisen between the modest
payouts to class members who remain in the class versus the much
higher returns to institutional investors who opt out and sue in
individual actions.7 Ultimately, as "exit" becomes a more popular
option, it should at last encourage real competition in the market for
class action professional services-that is, unless it can be thwarted by
adaptive responses by defendants and others, which possibility also
looms.
But greater exit is not a panacea. Ironically, it could even make
shareholders worse off under some scenarios. Two basic "downside"
scenarios exist.
First, the gains to those class members who exit the class could
come at the expense of the smaller shareholders who remain in the
class. Because a smaller class implies a smaller recovery and thus a
smaller fee award, class counsel's incentive could be diluted. At least
in theory, the net result could be a zero-sum game in which larger
shareholders win, but smaller shareholders lose.
Second, because recovery in securities class actions is ultimately
funded by the shareholders themselves, higher recoveries could generate
greater losses to investors. To understand this point, one must focus on
the wealth transfers uniquely inherent in securities class actions.
Typically, the members of the plaintiff class are paid the settlement by
the corporation (and not by the individual defendants). As a result, the
cost of the recovery falls primarily on those shareholders who are not in
the class. Because most shareholders are diversified and, over time,
will fall into both groups, even meritorious securities class actions may

(1995).
5 See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
6 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, 0RGANIZA TIONS, AND STATES ( 1970).
7 See infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
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simply transfer wealth among diversified shareholders, thus producing
neither net compensation nor real deterrence. 8 Worse yet, on each such
wealth transfer among shareholders, lawyers for both sides extract their
fees, thus ensuring that shareholder wealth is diminished. To the extent
that this critique is accurate, reforms that enhance the position of the
shareholder plaintiff could make securities litigation even more costly to
most shareholders by subjecting them to more wealth transfers. In this
light, the paradoxical problem with greater accountability is that the
interests of the shareholder plaintiffs and those of shareholders
generally can diverge.
At the outset, this essay needs to emphasize that, although it voices
serious criticisms of current class action practice, it also rejects some of
the standard critiques of the class action. This essay shares little
common ground with a viewpoint that much of the defense bar has
endlessly reiterated: namely, that securities class actions are frivolous
and extortionate, brought by legal shake-down artists seeking a quick
payoff.9 No time will be spent evaluating this critique, because it is
shrill, self-interested, and shallow-and also very out of date. As a
result of the PSLRA, recent Supreme Court decisions, and recently
tightened class certification standards, the truly "frivolous" securities
class action is today relatively rare-possibly even a mythic creature of
folklore, like the unicorn, in that it is much discussed, but seldom
objectively observed.
Organizationally, this essay will proceed in several stages. Part I
will survey the conflicts that may exist between the class and its counsel
8 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556-66 (2006). For example, assume that a
diversified public pension fund owns stock in 1,000 corporations and over a multi-year period,
100 of these corporations are sued in securities class actions. In 50 of these 100 cases, the
pension fund purchased stock within the class period; in 50, it did not. All cases settle. As a
result, at the end of this period, the pension fund has received the recovery in 50 cases and borne
the recovery in the other 50. Moreover, on each wealth transfer, substantial deductions must be
made for the legal expenses on both sides of the case and other transaction costs. These costs
likely exceed 50% of the recovery, thus implying that securities litigation produces a net loss for
our hypothetical pension fund. This same outcome follows in the equally likely case where the
pension fund bought stock both before and after the start of the class period and thus effectively
pays itself. To be sure, there may well be significant deterrent benefits from securities litigation,
but that topic is also debatable and beyond the scope of this essay. See id. at 1547-51. For
similar assessments, see Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages In Open-Market Securities
Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639 (1996); Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Camey, Vicarious Liability
for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theories and Evidence, U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 698-700 (1992).
9 The traditional theory of the "strike suit" was that it was a non-meritorious suit that
defendants found cheaper to settle for a small sum than to litigate. The settlement was thus based
on a litigation cost differential that favored the plaintiffs, but recent studies suggest that smaller
settlements are more a product of the issuer's size and the length of the class period than of the
action's limited merit. For a critique of this "strike suit" theory, see James D. Cox and Randall S.
Thomas, There Are Plaintiffs and . .. There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities
Class Action Settlements 61 V AND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1028287.
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and make the case that enhanced exit and greater competition could
alleviate some of these problems. Part II will examine the impact of
"voice-based" reforms, most notably the "lead plaintiff' provision of
the PSLRA. Part III will then tum to the "exit" option. Initially, it will
describe the recent trend towards "opting out" by large investors in
securities class actions and survey the differential in recoveries. Then,
it will analyze the various reasons why "opt outs" appear to outperform
class members in terms of their per share recoveries. Part IV will then
examine the implications of these developments, considering such
issues as (1) the impact of opting out on the remaining class members
and on shareholders generally; (2) the tactics that defense counsel
predictably may employ to deter opt outs; and (3) the implications under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("BRISA") for
institutions who continue to serve as a lead plaintiff (specifically, does
ERISA's "exclusive benefit" rule or similar common law obligations
require a large institution to opt out?). Part V will then offer some
tentative conclusions.

I.

THE ATTORNEY AS ENTREPRENEUR: CONFLICTS AND THE CASE FOR
COMPETITION

This essay will begin where a considerable body of academic
scholarship (including by this author) has left off: namely, with the
recognition that the plaintiffs attorney in class action litigation has
broad and unconfined discretion. 10 Obviously, such discretion implies a
potential for opportunistic conduct by the attorney, but the deeper point
is that this discretion arises because, and to the extent that, no
meaningful principal/agent relationship exists between the plaintiffs
counsel and its clients. As a consequence, the plaintiffs attorney can
behave less as an agent serving a principal and more as an independent
entrepreneur, one who in fact often hired the client. When the attorney
is able to hire the client, the normal principal/agent relationship has
been reversed.
Once, this was only a dry, academic point, but recently it has
grabbed headlines with the resolution of the Mil berg Weiss case and the
conviction of four of its former senior partners.1 1 Dramatic, juicy and
IO For earlier efforts by this author, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370
(2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, Balancing Fairness
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Coffee, supra note 1.
11 For overviews of this prosecution, see Martin Zimmerman & Molly Selvin, Lawyer Cuts
Deal in Kickback Case; Melvyn Weiss Was Accused of Paying Class-Action Plaintiffs. He ls
Expected to Get 18-33 Months, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at C3; Jonathan D. Glater, High
Profile Lawyer Agrees to Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at Cl. The law firm, now
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even scandalous as the Milberg Weiss prosecution may have been, what
does it really prove? If it implied only that some professionals had
cheated, this would not be surprising. Attorney misconduct happens on
the defense side as well, as evidenced by recent revelations involving
the role of attorneys in backdated stock options and accounting
irregularities. Although the Milberg Weiss prosecution has revealed
little behavior that was not already widely surmised, 12 it does clearly
show that over several decades the best known plaintiffs law firm in
the securities class action field long maintained and paid a stable of inhouse clients, each owning small investments in a large portfolio of
stocks. This arrangement gave Milberg Weiss instant access to clients
who could serve as plaintiffs when a new case arose, enabling them to
file their action before rival plaintiffs' firms might. Rather than serving
as agent for its clients, Milberg Weiss simply in-housed the client to
avoid delay and competition.
Some may still ask: But what is the real economic harm in the
attorney hiring the client? After all, an apologist might plausibly argue
that the interests of class members and their counsel are well-aligned
because the plaintiffs attorney is generally paid a percentage of the
recovery and thus has an obvious incentive to maximize the size of the
recovery-thereby benefiting its clients. 13 Why, then, is client control
so important? The answer here is critical: Absent client control, the
plaintiffs attorney will predictably deviate from the clients' preferences
to pursue the attorney's own interests. Why? The short answer is that
when the plaintiffs law firm is able to act as a rational and
unconstrained entrepreneur, it has very different interests, risk
preferences, and incentives than those of its clients, the class members,
and conflicts become inevitable. In the simplest and most extreme case,
known simply as "Milberg," has agreed to pay a $75 million fine and accept certain other
probationary convictions in order to avoid a criminal trial. See Jonathan D. Glater, Big Penalty
Set for Law Firm, But Not a Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2008, at Al.
12 In 1991, well before the current scandals, Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller
wrote: "[A]ttorneys are routinely forced to circumvent ethical restrictions on solicitation and
maintenance in order to obtain named plaintiffs as their ticket into profitable litigation." See
Macey & Miller, supra note l, at 6. With the passage of the PSLRA in 1995, paying the client
went from the status of an ethical violation to a criminal one. Section 21D(a)(2)(A)(vi) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi), added by the PSLRA, requires
the plaintiff in a securities class action to certify at the outset of the litigation "that the plaintiff
will not accept any payment for serving as a representative party on behalf of a class" other than
its pro-rata share of the recovery. Similarly, Section 2lD(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4), further
provides that "[t]he share of any final judgment or of any settlement that is awarded to a
representative party serving on behalf of a class shall be equal, on a per share basis, to the portion
of the final judgment or settlement awarded to all other members of the class."
13 This is essentially the argument advanced by Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman that
because the class action attorney receives an established percentage of the recovery, the
attorney's interests are well aligned with those of the class. See Myriam Gilles and Gary B.
Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial
Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006).

2008]

"EXIT" WORKS BETTER THAN "VOICE"

413

the plaintiffs attorney might exchange a cheap (or below-market)
settlement for a lucrative (and above-market) attorney's fee paid in
some form by the defendant. Class action law has long imposed some
constraints designed to prevent such collusion: a requirement of judicial
approval of any class action settlement, judicial control over fee awards,
and, more recently, the "lead plaintiff' provision, which gives control of
the class action to the class member with the largest stake in the action.
But all have had only marginal success at best.
Even when actual collusion between the plaintiffs attorney and the
defendants is not a factor, the more general problem is that plaintiffs
law firm has multiple reasons to be far more risk averse than its class
members and to settle more cheaply than its clients would want. First,
plaintiffs attorneys have more at stake than their clients. Typically,
class counsel expects a contingent fee in the vicinity of 25% of the
recovery, 14 and no class member will likely own a similar percentage of
the defendant's stock to give it an equivalent stake in the action. Also,
class counsel may often be required to invest millions of dollars in costs
and expenses in order to advance the litigation. When one adds these
two amounts-the expenses that the attorney must bear and the
attorney's expected contingent fee-the attorney has far more at stake
than any individual class member. Second, time is money, and delay
for class counsel means additional costs and expenses that the attorney
alone bears; thus, the attorney/entrepreneur has more reason to desire an
early settlement than the client. This may lead the attorney to accept a
large discount off the likely outcome at trial to obtain that settlement. 15
Finally, because plaintiffs fee awards are typically a declining
percentage of the recovery, 16 the attorney benefits less from an increase
in the recovery than does his or her clients. These factors can be

14 During earlier decades, the fee award in securities class actions averaged approximately
32% of the settlement. See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR, TODDS. FOSTER, VINITA M. JUNEJA &
DENISE M. MARTIN, RECENT TRENDS III: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER
CLASS ACTIONS? 7 (June 1995); see also VINCENTE. O'BRIEN, A STUDY OF CLASS ACTION
SECURITIES FRAUD CASES, 1988-1996, (also finding 32% to be the average fee award). The
average fee award has probably declined in recent years, both because of the impact of the lead
plaintiff and (at least as important) the advent of settlements near to or over $1 billion. Because
fee awards are a declining percentage of the recovery, higher settlements imply lower average fee
awards (in percentage terms). Settlements over several hundred million dollars today often
produce single digit percentage fee awards, but the 25% presumptive fee award remains alive and
well in the case of lesser settlements. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2002) ( appendix lists percentage of fund fee awards in cases where fund fell between $50 and
$200 million between 1996 and 2001 and finds approximately half the fee awards were above
25% and half below); Craft v. County of San Bernardino, No. EDCV05-0359SGL, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27526 at *39 (C.D. Cal. April I, 2008) (finding that "25% is very much the norm").
15 Suggestively, some plaintiffs' attorneys are known-rather derisively in lawyer's
vernacular-as "pilgrims" because they openly favor "early settlements."
16 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study, I J. EMPIRICAL STUD. 27 (2004).
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exploited by defendants, and they help explain why so few securities
class actions ever go to trial. Risk aversion induces the plaintiffs
attorney to settle at a discounted price that would not be attractive to a
risk-neutral decision-maker, and crippling collective action problems
prevent class members from objecting effectively.
Apart from these conflicts, class members may simply have
heterogeneous preferences such that no single counsel can satisfy all of
them. Some may wish to settle early, others to hold out; some want an
all monetary recovery, while some public pension funds today desire
corporate governance reforms to be incorporated into the settlement.
These divergences provide an entirely alternative reason for opting out.
This thesis, that plaintiffs attorneys tend to be motivated to settle
"cheaply" on terms that class members, if they had perfect knowledge
and full control over their "agent," would reject, is corroborated by the
extraordinarily low rate of recovery in securities class actions.
According to one well-known study, the ratio of securities class action
settlements to investors' economic losses has ranged over recent years
between two and three percent. 17 Of course, this low recovery rate
could be explained by legal and factual difficulties inherent in the
securities class action. Such difficulties do exist, and this interpretation
would be plausible-but for new evidence, shortly to be discussed, that
class members who opt out and flee the class seem to do extraordinarily
better than those who remain within the class. Those who opt out face
basically the same legal barriers; thus, if they do significantly better, the
one variable that can most logically explain this difference in outcome
is the different relationship that these "opt out" plaintiffs have with their
attorneys. 18
Even if class counsel in securities litigation has underperformed, is
it reasonable to believe that class counsel's performance can be
improved? As an opening generalization, whenever one detects slack or
consistently substandard performance in a market (including a market
for professional services), it is usually a safe diagnosis to predict that
competition is lacking in the relevant market. As a result, the
prescription may seem obvious; improve competition and presumably
you will improve attorney performance. Yet, the PSLRA has done little
to foster competition within the securities class action bar. 19 Ironically,
its principal impact has been to strengthen the incentives for firms to
17 In 2002, 2003, and 2004, the ratio was 2.7%, 2.9% and 2.4%, respectively. The highest
percentage that settlements have recently borne to investor losses was 7.2% in 1996. See Elaine
Buckberg et. al., RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: ARE
WORLDCOM AND ENRON THE NEW STANDARD? 6 (NERA Econ. Consulting 2005).
18 See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. "Opt out" plaintiffs who sue in state court
do escape the special barriers imposed by the PSLRA, but, as later discussed, this factor cannot
alone account for the size of the disparity.
19 See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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cooperate, rather than compete. 20 Also, as the PSLRA raised the level
of risk associated with securities litigation while at the same time
stretching out the period over which payment must be deferred to the
contingent-fee compensated attorney, the PSLRA probably reduced the
expected value of securities class litigation. In tum, this implied that
only larger firms with diversified portfolios and better financing (or
networks of firms, sharing the risk among them) could accept the
enhanced risk and delay in securities litigation. Even though the
PSLRA was aimed like a rifle shot at the Milberg Weiss firm, its initial
impact was to strengthen the Milberg Weiss firm's oligopolistic
position. 21
If enhancing competition should be the policy goal, how does one
achieve this? To date, most policy proposals intended to hold plaintiffs
counsel more accountable to the class have sought to give the class a
greater "voice" in the selection and supervision of class counsel. The
classic such reform is the PSLRA's "lead plaintiff' provision, which
presumptively assigns control of the securities class action to the
volunteering class member with the largest stake in the action. Such
"voice"-based proposals may well be sensible, but they have done
relatively little to improve competition. Rather, as discussed in more
detail shortly, their practical effect has been to induce prospective
candidates for class counsel to (a) join together to form the largest
possible plaintiff consortium in order to win the lead plaintiff position,
and (b) spend considerable sums soliciting and attracting large public
pension funds, sometimes by questionable means. The wining, dining
and political support of state pension officials-practices known in the
parlance as "pay to play"-may be a form of competition, but it has
done little for class members generally. Rather, such practices raise
barriers that may exclude smaller and start-up firms that are either
unable to make sizable political contributions or are too new to have
already gained the good will of the officials that choose class counsel.
Less noticed than "voice," an alternative approach both makes
more sense and has already begun to affect the competitive balance in
the market for plaintiff's counsel. This alternative involves not
enhanced voice, but greater use of right to exit the class-or "opt out"
in the language of lawyers. To understand this approach, it is necessary

20 See infra

notes 32-35 and accompanying text.

21 The Milberg firm did, however, move slower than its competitors to establish relationships

with public pension funds, and this ultimately proved costly to them. For a time, they attempted
to knit together large networks of individual plaintiffs to serve as lead plaintiffs, but the SEC
opposed this effort as inconsistent with the intent of the PSLRA. See In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig.,
186 F.R.D. 214 (D.D.C. 1999) (rejecting certification of class with 20 lead plaintiffs at SEC's
urging). In an amicus brief, which the district court appended to its opinion, the SEC urged the
Baan court to limit the lead plaintiffs to a "small number" so that they could feasibly monitor
their counsel.
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to start with an insight first developed by Harvard economist Albert
Hirschman, who noted decades ago in a slim and classic book that the
real choice when one seeks to modify organizational behavior is
between "voice" and "exit." 22 Hirschman postulated that the critical
question was whether the members of the firm, organization or state
would benefit more from (1) increased rights to participate in the body's
governance, or (2) increased ability to flee the body at low cost.
Ironically, while academics have largely missed the significance of this
option and defendants have warned of the dangers associated with
greater "exit" by class members, the reality is that the most
sophisticated class members are today voting with their feet, fleeing the
class and thereby expressing their preference of "exit" over "voice."
What specifically is happening? Since the modem class action
rules were formalized with the promulgation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 in
1968, class members in a class action seeking money damages (i.e., a
Rule 23(b)(3) class action) have possessed an express right to "opt out"
- that is, the right to exit the class and sue in an individual action.
Recent federal decisions have treated this right as virtually an element
of due process. 23 Yet, over most of the interval between 1968 and
today, this right has been generally viewed as illusory and largely
worthless. Indeed, for most class members, the right to opt out probably
is of limited value. This is because the basic rationale underlying the
class action is that small claims only have value if they can be
aggregated into a larger body that can afford the high transaction costs
of litigation. 24 Otherwise, small claimants hold "negative value" claims
that cost more to enforce than they are individually worth. 25 Given the
prevalence of "negative value" claims in most class actions, the right to
opt out represents merely a formal and empty right for most class
members. But securities class actions are a marked and dramatic
exception to this pattern. The rise of the institutional investor to the
22 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 6.
23 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (instructing lower courts to avoid

certifying non-opt out settlements except in strict compliance with Rule 23(b)(2)). Several
subsequent decisions have rejected non-opt out settlements, citing constitutional concerns.
Beckert v. TPLC Holdings, Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 873-74, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2000); Jefferson v.
Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999).
24 In Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997), the Supreme Court noted
that the rationale for the class action lay in the fact that "small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to prosecute his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an
attorney's) labor."
25 Even those decisions most critical of the class action have recognized that "[t]he most
compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class action [is] the existence of a negative value
suit." See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996). A negative value case
is usually defined as a case "in which the costs of enforcement in an individual action would
exceed the expected individual recovery." See In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Lab. Litig., 204
F.R.D. 330,348 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
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point where such investors today hold a majority of the stock in
publicly-held firms (a development that was largely subsequent to the
formalization of class action rules in 1968)26 implies that most of the
stock purchased by the plaintiff class in a securities class action will be
held by institutional investors whose large stakes can justify and support
individual litigation. Indeed, because institutional investors tend to
trade more actively than retail investors (who typically follow a buyand-hold strategy for a variety of reasons, including higher brokerage
commissions), it follows that institutional investors will represent a
higher percentage of the plaintiff class than they do of the shareholder
population in general. Nevertheless, for a long time, institutional
investors were indifferent to the prospect of litigation; indeed, they
often failed even to claim their share of class action settlements. 27 Only
recently has this changed. Institutional investors have seen that large
recoveries are possible in individual suits and are now prepared to sue.
In response, a legal market has developed to solicit and accommodate
them. This process is still ongoing and possibly at an early stage.
Now comes the next and even more surprising development: When
institutional investors exit the class and sue individually, they appear to
do dramatically better-by an order of magnitude! This development
has generated anxiety among defendants and plaintiffs class counsel,
both of whom will lose if class actions are depleted by a high
percentage of opt outs. Ominous as this trend may appear to defense
counsel, this essay's thesis will be that this is an optimistic
development. It shows us a reform that actually works: liberalized
"exit" can and does vastly outperform enhanced "voice." But what
about the smaller retail shareholder who cannot opt out? How will they
be affected? Although it is arguable that the smaller size of the
remaining class (which implies a smaller fee award to plaintiffs
counsel) will result in class counsel being less motivated, the alternative
and more logical scenario is that increased "exit" will kickstart a more
active competition into existence among plaintiffs attorneys. To
prosper, each attorney must demonstrate that it can obtain superior
results for its clients. If the class settlement seems "cheap," the larger
institutions will simply flee the class by opting out. If one believes in
competition, this is precisely how results should play out; that is, class
26 For general discussions of the level of institutional stock ownership and its shift over time,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of
Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985).
27 See James D. Cox, Jr. & Randall Thomas, Leaving Money On the Table: Do Institutional
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002); James D.
Cox, Jr. & Randall Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and
Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class
Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV.411 (2005).
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counsel should be able to prosper if and only to the extent that the class
is satisfied.

IL

CLASS ACTION GOVERNANCE: WHY VOICE DOES NOT ENCOURAGE
COMPETITION

Prior to the PSLRA in 1995, securities class actions and antitrust
class actions were organized in a basically similar fashion. Typically, a
multiplicity of actions would be filed in district courts all over the
country, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML")
would determine to which district court it would refer these actions for
pre-trial coordination and discovery. 28 Such a referral was necessary
because otherwise the first plaintiffs team to settle with the defendants
would bar the other suits, as the first settlement (and the release that the
named plaintiff would grant incident to that settlement on behalf of the
class) would carry preclusive effect. Today, this danger that the first
team to settle wins has been largely mitigated by the JPML, which
moves all the competing actions to the same court and thereby
discourages races to settlement, but the danger still arises when
overlapping class actions are pending in state and federal court.
Let's assume then that the JPML assigns the case to a specific
district court judge. What happens next? The classic folklore was that
the first to file would be named lead counsel (and thus have control over
the settlement process). But no decision or no judicial rule ever
articulated such a standard.
What actually happened was more complex. The court to which
the JPML assigned the case might find that it had ten to twenty different
complaints before it, each seeking discovery or pretrial relief. The
logical first step for the court was to organize the action, establishing
committees of counsel to deal with various issues. Recognizing that the
court would eventually appoint a lead counsel, the participating law
firms usually sought to preempt the court from choosing counsel by
organizing their side of the case and electing their own lead counsel.
Few courts were sufficiently strong-minded to reject the plaintiffs
counsel's choice, particularly when this saved the court work. The
result was usually a hotel room political convention at which all the
participating plaintiffs attorneys elected a lead counsel and a steering
committee. As in all political conventions, political horse trading
28 The JPML was created in 1968 (at roughly the same time as the modern class action rules
were formalized). See Pub. L. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
The powers of the JPML were trimmed by the Supreme Court in Lexecon Inc. v. Mi/berg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), which held that, after discovery was completed,
the case had to be transferred back to the original court in which it was filed.
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occurred. In order to win votes, a candidate had to broker deals under
which those supporting the candidate would be placed on the steering
committee and effectively promised billable work for which they could
earn fees (if the action settled). The losing side would receive no such
promises and might be excluded from work assignments; thus, they
might receive no fees, because the court awarding fees would usually
defer to the allocation of fees within this ad hoc law firm recommended
by the elected class counsel.
Sometimes, disputes would flair and the contending sides would
appear before the judge and publicly criticize each other. In these
disputes, the truth sometimes emerged that many attorneys in smaller
law firms had been invited into the action not to litigate, but to vote for
their friends. 29 The core problem with this political convention
approach to the organization of an "ad hoc" plaintiff's law firm was that
there was no nominating or credentials committee that decided who was
eligible to vote. As a result, the ballot box could be stuffed. More
typically, however, the action would get organized on an amicable basis
(but one that recognized the political strength of the contending
factions). Some plaintiff's attorneys were noted for their political skills
at crafting compromises and fashioning acceptable slates. Although
they were not necessarily excellent litigators, they would inevitably end
up with some high position, either on the steering committee or as colead counsel, because they could broker deals.
What then explains the conventional "first to file, wins"
perception? The "first to file" law firm often invited in its allies to
ensure that it could outvote other potential contenders. Even those
firms that were not such allies needed to file an action immediately to
ensure that they would be included in the informal selection process.
Once the potential candidates were known, the brokers could then strike
deals, exchanging votes for their slate for critical seats on the steering
committee. What looked from a distance like a competitive race was
more a consensual and highly political process of log rolling.
A hidden cost was, however, associated with this system:
overstaffing. Twenty attorneys or more might wind up with some
position or title, but only some of them would do "real" litigation work.
In turn, overstaffing forced productive attorneys to share their fees with
unproductive (and indeed absent) attorneys, and this dulled the
incentive of even the productive to work hard on the case. Because the
fee award was inevitably limited by some maximum percentage of the
recovery that the court would not exceed, 30 participating counsel might
29 For a detailed examination of one such episode (involving an antitrust class action), see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 252-62 (1983).
30 During prior decades, this ceiling was somewhere above 33% of the action (which was the
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realize that all time expended on the case could not be successfully
recovered. Thus, the "political" attorney who specialized in dealmaking within the plaintiffs team was effectively subsidized out of the
pockets of those counsel who did the actual work.
Another consequence of this brokered system for the organization
of the class action was that it eliminated open competition. Although
there were occasional struggles within the plaintiffs camp that broke
into the open, plaintiffs attorneys did not want these battles publicized.
Most could not afford to make enemies within the plaintiffs bar for fear
that they would be excluded from future plaintiffs teams. Smaller and
new entrant firms learned, just like junior Congressmen, that one got
along by going along. Overstaffed and undermotivated, the traditional
"ad hoc" plaintiffs law firm was a model of inefficiency.3 1
The PSLRA changed this picture dramatically, but it did not
increase competition. Being "first to file" no longer made any sense,
because the PSLRA gave effective control of the securities class action
to the class member or members with the largest losses who volunteered
to serve, even if it never filed an action. Indeed, a large institutional
investor could take control of the class action simply by offering to
serve as lead plaintiff-without ever filing any lawsuit or seeking the
support of others. Quickly, the plaintiffs bar learned to develop
relationships with public pension funds, unions and other organizations
that held large stock positions. Milberg Weiss moved relatively slowly
towards this new system, hoping to continue to compete by assembling
large aggregations of small plaintiffs. The SEC opposed such large
aggregations, however, on the grounds that they could not adequately
monitor the attorney and so were inconsistent with the PSLRA's
statutory intent.3 2 As a result, because it changed its position slowly,
Milberg Weiss's near monopoly position eroded, and other firms
secured important lead counsel positions.
Although contests still arose under this system, the participants
soon learned how to minimize them. Law firms could and did solicit
institutions to serve as lead plaintiff (with the understanding that the law
firm would be chosen by the institution as its class counsel), but other
law firms could respond by seeking to assemble a rival and larger
consortium of pension funds and thereby win the contest. Often,
counsel feared up to the last moment that some rival firm or firms
average fee award in securities class actions). See supra note 14.
31 For discussions of patronage systems in which committee positions and leadership roles in
the class action were awarded in return for support in the election of lead counsel, see Coffee,
supra note 29, at 256-58.
32 The SEC expressed its opposition to a large number of shareholders sharing the position of
lead plaintiff in In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation, 186 F.R.D. 214 (D.D.C. 1999). See supra
note 20. Since that time, few law firms have attempted to assemble more than five or six
shareholders to serve collectively as lead plaintiffs.
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would enter the competition with a larger consortium of clients. As a
result, the logical strategy was not to proceed on a "lone wolf' basis, but
instead to assemble groups of law firms who could combine their clients
into a larger consortium of institutions. Put differently, it was in the
interest of law firm X not to compete with law firm Y, but rather to pool
their institutional clients so that they could stave off the threat from still
other potential competitors.
Professors Choi and Thompson have provided empirical support
for this hypothesis, finding that in the post-PSLRA period, the number
of cases with a solo lead plaintiff law firm fell from 31.9% (in the prePSLRA period) to 19.6% immediately afterward. 33
Previously,
consortiums of more than two law firms had been rare, but Choi and
Thompson identified, out of a sample of 219 post-PSLRA suits, some
78 cases (or nearly 36%) in which three, four, five or even more law
firms shared the lead counsel position. 34 Once again, the better political
brokers could knit together large coalitions that would hold larger
equity stakes.
In theory, law firms might share the lead counsel position for other
reasons than the need to assemble the largest equity stake-for example,
to create a synergistic combination of legal skills or to achieve efficient
risk diversification. Although these could be secondary motives, the
driving force in the real world was the need to protect one's position
against potential larger coalitions that might arise at the last minute.
Corroboration for this conclusion lies in the fact that, although law
firms could always combine to serve as co-class counsel, sharing a
single client, actual cases of co-counsel sharing a single client have
proven rare, both before and after the PSLRA. This suggests that
synergy and risk diversification were not the primary motivators behind
law firm coalitions. Rather, the cement that held together law firm
coalitions was the need to assemble a client mass that would preempt
competitive efforts by other teams of attorneys. As noted above, only in
19.6% of the post-PSLRA cases did law firms proceed on a solo basis,
and these cases probably consisted of either ( 1) those that were too
small in terms of the expected recovery to attract competition or (2)
those in which the solo firm represented a client of preemptive size (for
example, CalPERS).
As experience was gained with contests over the lead plaintiff
position, Choi and Thompson find that "repeat relationships" have
developed "between lead plaintiff law firms and institutional investors"
and that "institutional investors that potentially act as lead plaintiffs
tend to develop repeat relationships with only a handful of the top-tier
33 See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1520-21 (2006).
34 Id. at 1521 (Table 4).
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plaintiff law firms." 35 Choi and Thompson express uncertainty at what
forces were behind these "repeat relationships," but certainly political
campaign contributions were likely one such force (and competition on
this score obviously favors the larger and entrenched law firm). To be
sure, such "repeat relationships" could also be based on the institutions'
successful prior experience with some law firms, but once these
"relationships" formed, they became a barrier to new entrants.
At least in the case of the public pension funds, much anecdotal
evidence suggests that inter-firm competition for class counsel is largely
waged on a basis that does little for absent class members. Today, it is
the common practice for the larger plaintiffs' firms to entertain the
officials of public pension funds (often lavishly) and to make political
contributions to the elected public officials who control the fund's
decision. For example, in the case of New York State, the State
Comptroller is the sole trustee with full power over their pension funds'
respective decisions. As an elected official in a state characterized by
notoriously expensive political campaigns, the New York State
Comptroller needs to raise political contributions, and plaintiffs law
firms need to curry his favor. Although this result was not intended by
the PSLRA, it quickly became a marriage made in political heaven for
both sides. To illustrate, in one major class action, the New York State
Comptroller was estimated to have received $200,000 in political
contributions from two law firms (and the families of their partners) in
the year following their selection as co-class counsel in a case in which
the two firms eventually received a $55 million fee award. 36 In fairness,
these contributions may often be defensive in character; that is, one
plaintiffs law firm makes a contribution in order to keep pace with its
rivals and not be excluded from consideration as class counsel.
Nonetheless, the net result of this "pay to play" system of exchanging
political contributions for lead plaintiff designations is to rent the
pension fund as a lead plaintiff to the highest contributors. It may do
little damage to the pension funds, but it does effectively exclude
smaller firms and new entrants who have not previously made
contributions.
Viewed in terms of a traditional antitrust concentration analysis,
the overall concentration level within the securities plaintiffs' bar
neither rose nor declined significantly after the enactment of the PSLRA
in 1995. Professors Choi and Thompson estimate the market share
percentage of the top five plaintiffs' firms before and after the PSLRA,

Id. at 1529.
36 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587,
35

1611 (2006).
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as follows: 37
Pre-PSLRA Market Share Percentages
Milberg Weiss
WolfHaldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
Berger & Montague
Abbey & Ellis/Abbey Gardy
Total:

27.9%
11.0%
8.1%
4.8%
4.4%
56.2%

Post-PSLRA Market Share Percentages
Milberg Weiss
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
Wolf Popper
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz
Barack Rodos & Bacine
Total:

27.4%
9.0%
5.7%
5.4%
4.7%
52.2%

In short, some firms rose and others fell, presumably in line with
their ability to win lead plaintiff designations, but in total there has been
only a small (4%) decline in the concentration level. Moreover, this
modest shift in the direction of greater competition may have been more
than offset by the increased need of plaintiffs law firms to pool their
clients to win the coveted lead plaintiff status and by the development
of "repeat relationships." From a competitive standpoint, the market for
class counsel services has basically remained static before and after the
PSLRA.
Of course, the modest nature of the above changes would mean
little if lead plaintiffs were doing more for the class, achieving either
larger settlements or recovering a higher percentage of the class
members' losses.
Such data, however, seems largely lacking.
Professors Cox and Thomas found in 2006 that the ratio of settlement
amounts to estimated provable losses in securities class actions has
actually declined since the passage of the PSLRA38 and that settlement
size also did not increase following the PSLRA.39 Although they found

37
38

Choi & Thompson, supra note 33, at 1515.
See Cox & Thomas with Kiku, supra note 36, at 1627.

39 The mean settlement size did increase from $9,734,000 to $15,728,000, but the "median"
settlement size rose only from $5,500,000 to $5,745,000. Id. at 1624. Both shifts may be largely
the consequence of inflation and the increased size of the market capitalization of defendant
corporations in the post-PSLRA period. Cox and Thomas find that overall settlement size did not
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some evidence that institutional lead plaintiffs did better for their class
members in terms of settlement size as compared with other categories
of lead plaintiffs, 40 this finding was more than offset by their more
pessimistic finding that "institutional lead plaintiffs have the lowest
average and median recovery percentages of any group." 41 Taken
together, these twin facts suggest that institutional lead plaintiffs simply
gravitate towards the larger case.
Equally striking was Professors Cox and Thomas's finding that
individuals continue to be lead plaintiffs in the plurality of cases. They
report that single institutions and combinations of institutions with
individuals accounted for only 18% of the cases in their post-PSLRA
sample, while groups of individuals accounted for 41 % of post-PSLRA
settlements. 42 This suggests both that the desire of institutions to serve
as lead plaintiff has been modest and that law firms were happy to
aggregate clients on any basis they could.
What then is the bottom line? Once they controlled for all obvious
variables, Professors Cox and Thomas report that "post-PSLRA
settlements are not statistically different from those in the pre-PSLRA
period."43 Thus, they conclude:
"These results suggest that the enactment of the PSLRA had no
significant impact on settlement size."44
Worse yet, they find that:
"Investors appear to be recovering a smaller percentage of their
losses today than they did before the passage of the PSLRA. "45
Nor does it appear likely that institutions will eventually serve as
lead plaintiffs in most cases. Institutional lead plaintiffs, Cox and
Thomas conclude, are "very selective" in their choice of cases, agreeing
to serve as lead plaintiffs only in the largest cases with the potentially
greatest damages. 46 Although Professors Cox and Thomas remain
optimistic about the ability of institutions to improve settlements, the
problem that confounds their optimism is that institutions may find that
they can do even better for themselves by opting out. Overall, although
the PSLRA has changed securities litigation, there is little evidence that
it has yet improved investor welfare or even enhanced competition.

change in any statistically significant way. Id. at 163 7.
40 Id. at 1624. The fact that institutional plaintiffs tend to serve in larger cases against larger
defendants probably explains this finding. Id. at 1625-26.
41 Id. at 1627.
42 Id. at 1623.
43 Id. at 1628-29.
44 Id. at 1629.
45 Id. at 1637.
46 Id. at 1629.
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THE "EXIT" ALTERNATIVE

The New Trend Toward Opting Out

For decades, institutions did not opt out. Nor did they serve as
class representatives. Rather, they simply remained passive. Only with
the PSLRA did they face a need to consider their position with respect
to securities litigation. In the wake of the PSLRA, they were regularly
lectured by both plaintiffs' and defense counsels that to opt out would
be disloyal and selfish-an attempt to steal an advantage over smaller
class members. Over the years, this author has sat on a number of
panels at conferences organized for institutional investors by prominent
plaintiffs' law firms. After suitable wining and dining, the institutional
officials would hear panels of experts debate current issues. But
eventually, at some point, plaintiffs counsel and defense counsel would
link arms and explain in common the fallacy of opting out. Institutional
opt outs would force defendants to reserve funds for the opt out actions,
they would explain, and this would slow and reduce the recovery in the
class action. In the long run, they would conclude, all investors would
be worse off.
For a time, this jawboning worked. But it appears to have broken
down as plaintiffs' firms developed ongoing "repeat relationships" with
particular institutional investors who were willing to serve as lead
plaintiffs. Once these relationships developed, it became easier for the
plaintiffs law firm to approach its clients when the law firm lost the
contest for class counsel and to suggest that they proceed on an
individual basis in state court. Logically, the plaintiffs law firm has
every incentive to solicit its client pension funds to opt out and sue in
state court because that was the only course of action that would likely
yield it any fee. But why did the client follow? Possibly, the pension
funds trusted these law firms with whom they now had established
relationships, or possibly more problematic "pay-to-play" practices
induced the clients to take their lawyers' advice. In some cases, the
clients may simply have been outraged over how little they would
receive in the class settlement. Whatever the institutions' particular
motivations, their experience serving as a lead plaintiff under the
PSLRA's provisions seems likely to have been at least a "but for" cause
of this new phenomenon.
Changes in the case law may also have facilitated this
development. Once, the federal judge handling the class action could
use the All Writs Act to prevent any individual opt out action in state
court from proceeding to trial on the grounds that an imminent trial in
state court might jeopardize the settlement in federal court. This was
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the seeming implication of In re Baldwin-United Corp., 47 which had
upheld the federal court's power to enjoin state trials likely to disrupt
any pending settlement. This changed with the WorldCom litigation, in
which Judge Denise Cote sought to bar a state court trial in Alabama in
a case brought by opt out plaintiffs on these grounds and was
overturned in 2004 by the Second Circuit, which found that a District
Court could not enjoin a state trial simply because it was likely to delay
the scheduled trial in federal court. 4s It is uncertain whether this
decision encouraged other institutions to opt out, but, at least for the
future, opt outs seem more able to proceed to trial without serious fear
of federal court intervention.
The first major securities case in which numerous class members
were solicited to opt out appears to have been WorldCom, and the
instigator was the redoubtable William Lerach. His firm had lost the
contest to become class counsel in the WorldCom class action to the
Bernstein, Litowitz firm (largely because the New York State Pension
Fund, which was represented by Bernstein, Litowitz, held a very large
position in WorldCom's bonds). Rather than simply play a subsidiary
role in the class action, Mr. Lerach convinced some 65 investors to opt
out of the WorldCom action. 49 Although the WorldCom class action
eventually settled for $6.2 billion, at the time a record amount, the opt
outs have claimed to have done much better. In 2005, three large
California pension funds-CalPERS, CalSTRS, and the Los Angeles
County Employee Retirement System-announced that they had settled
their opt-out claims for $257.4 million. 5 Five New York City pension
funds similarly opted out and settled their $130 million in claims for
$78.9 million, and their counsel announced that this settlement
amounted to "three times more than they would have recovered if they
had joined the class." 51 These claims have been disputed by class
counsel in WorldCom, and this essay will not attempt to resolve this
dispute. Whatever the reality, the WorldCom opt outs were a signal to
the institutional investor community that they could possibly do better

°

47 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985).
48 See Ret. Sys. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2004). The decision has

murky edges, because some weight was placed on the allegedly distinguishing fact that no
settlement was imminent in WorldCom whereas it had been in Baldwin-United. At the same
time, the Second Circuit did permit the removal of individual bondholder suits from state court to
federal court despite an express anti-removal provision in the Securities Act of 1933. See Cal.
Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Worldcom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, however, the
Second Circuit was protecting the power of the bankruptcy court to assume control over related
cases.
49 See Kevin LaCroix, Opt-Outs: A Worrisome Trend in Securities Class Action Litigation,
INSIGHTS, April 2007.
50 Id. at 3.
51 Id. For a similar estimate, see David Lenckus, Individual Suits Likely Over Subprime
Losses; Some Investors Expected to Opt Out of Class Actions, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Nov. 19,
2007.
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by opting out.
If WorldCom was the beginning, the case that truly marked the
floodgates opening wide on opting out was the AOL Time Warner class
action, which settled on a class basis in 2006 for $2.4 billion-again a
landmark settlement. This time, Mr. Lerach convinced more than one
hundred investors to pursue individual opt out actions.5 2 Based on a
variety of press reports, these opt outs appear to have done significantly
better than if they had stayed in the class, with the University of
California settling for $246 million, the Ohio State Pension Funds for
$144 million, CalPERS for $117. 7 million, and CalSTRS for $105
million. 53 As each opt out settled, they announced how much better
they had done than if they had participated in the class. For example,
the State of Alaska settled its $60 million claim for $50 million and said
that it had done "50 times what we would have recovered from the
class." 54 CalPERS claimed losses of approximately $129 million, so its
settlement for $117. 7 million represents a seeming 90% recovery rate.
Such recoveries (between 80% and 90% in the cases of Alaska and
CalPERS) not only vastly exceed the typical 2% to 3% recovery rate in
most securities class actions, but are much higher than the settlement
ratio in any form of private civil litigation. CalPERS's general counsel
described its settlement as "approximately 17 times what we would
have recovered if we stayed in the class," estimating that it would have
received only $6 million under the class action; 55 similarly, CalSTRS
estimated that it would have received only $15 million under the class
action (but received $105 million to settle its opt-out action). 56 The
University of California estimated that it did "16 to 24 times" better
than what it would have received under the class settlement. 57 The State
of Ohio's Attorney General estimated that his state's five pension funds
(which received $144 million plus $3 l million in legal fees and
expenses) received $135 million more than they would have received
under the class settlement. 58 These are not small differences.
If AOL Time Warner showed that the floodgates had opened for
opt outs, the Qwest class action holds the dubious honor of being the
52 See Josh Gerstein, Investors Opt Out of Time Warner Class Action Suit, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 8,
2006, at 5.
53 See LaCroix, supra note 49; Gilbert Chan, Ca/PERS' Time Strategy Pays Off: The state
pension fund gets $117. 7 million after opting out of class action against media giant,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 15, 2007. Pat Coughlin, counsel to the opt outs, has estimated that they
did "20 times" better than under the class. See Lenckus, supra note 51.
54 See Josh Gerstein, Time Warner Case Finds a Surprise, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 7, 2006, at l; see
also LaCroix, supra note 49.
55 Chan, supra note 53 (quoting Peter Nixon, CalPERS' general counsel).

56 id.
57 id. (quoting Christopher Patti, an in-house attorney for the University).
58 See Time Warner Settles Lawsuit for $144 Million," L.A. TIMES, Mar.

(quoting Ohio Attorney General Marc Dann).

8, 2007, at C6
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first in which the total payments to opt outs actually exceeded those to
the class. The Qwest class action settled in 2005 for $400 million, 59 but
to date Qwest has disclosed payments of $411 million to opt outs.60 In
late November, 2007, the Alaska Attorney General issued a press
release announcing that the state's various funds had settled their $89
million in claims in the Qwest litigation for a net recovery (after
attorneys' fees) of $19 million and that this recovery contrasted with a
payment of only $427,000 that they would have received under the class
settlement.6 1 This is roughly a 45: 1 ratio. Similarly, the Teachers
Retirement System of Texas announced a $61.6 million net recovery
and contrasted it with a $1.4 million payment that it would have
received under the class action settlement. 62 CalSTRS settled for $46.5
million and announced that it was receiving "about 30 times more than
it would have recovered if it had taken part in the class action."63
This pattern has continued to accelerate in late 2007 and early
2008. A dramatic example is the Tyco International class action, which
settled in December 2007 for $3 .2 billion. 64 But, even in this near
record settlement, the court's order approving the settlement listed some
288 opt outs. 65 Most of these opt outs appear to have been mutual
funds,66 which is itself a significant development because it shows that
the plaintiffs bar has now built a bridge to more traditional sectors of
the investment community (and not just public pension funds). Once,
mutual funds appear to have disdained to claim even their share of the
recovery, 67 but today they are actively pursuing litigation on their own.
The counsel representing these institutional opt outs included many of
the leading firms in class action bar: Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger &
Grossmann; Lowey Dannenberg; and Lieff, Cabraser Heimann &
Bemstein. 68 Having now developed relationships with both mutual
59 The stipulation of settlement was filed on November 23, 2005.
See In re Qwest
Communications Int'! Inc. Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71267, No. 01-cv-01451-REBCBS, at *8 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2006).
60 See Robert Elder, Retired Teachers System, Qwest Reach Settlement, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Dec. 6, 2007 at Dl; see also Kevin LaCroix, Opt-Outs, Claims Severity and D&O
Insurance Limits, D&O DIARY, Feb. 5, 2007, available at http://dandodiary.blogspot.com.
61 See Press Release, Alaska Dep't of Law, Department of Law Announces $19 Million
Settlement in Securities Fraud Claims Against Qwest Communications (Nov. 21, 2007), available
at http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/civil/SecureQwestCommunication.pdf.
62 See Elder, supra note 60. This would be better than a 40: 1 ratio.
63 See LaCroix, supra note 60.
64 See 3.2 Billion Settlement in Class Action Against Tyco and PricewaterhouseCoopers
Approved, CLASS ACTION MONITOR, Jan. 15, 2008.
Tyco paid $2.95 billion, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers contributed $225 million to this settlement.
65 See In re Tyco Int'! Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02-1335-PB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95199
(D.N.H. Dec. 19, 2007).
66 Id.; see also The Tyco Opt Out Cases Continue to Trickle In, SEC. LITIG. WATCH, Feb. 11,
2008, available at http://slw.riskmetrics.com (listing the mutual fund families opting out).
67 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 871-78.
68 See Tyco, supra note 66.
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funds and pension funds, these firms can predictably solicit class
members to opt out in any case in which they are not chosen as class
counsel.
Will institutional investors do better than if they stayed in the
class? Although one cannot predict outcomes with confidence, the first
individual suit against Tyco has recently settled for $73.3 million, and it
was brought by New Jersey's public pension funds.69 Such a recovery
seemingly exceeds what New Jersey's share of the class action
settlement would have been.10
For the immediate future, secunties litigation is likely to be
dominated by cases growing out of the subprime mortgage debacle, and
cases asserting such claims are now being filed at a potentially record
rate. These cases are particularly likely to produce a high rate of opt
outs because, typically, the class consists of debt purchasers who bought
collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") from underwriters in
registered public offerings. Such debt purchasers are characteristically
institutional investors. Moreover, the Securities Act of 1933 (unlike the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934) confers concurrent jurisdiction on
state courts and even contains an anti-removal provision that prevents
the defendant from returning the case to federal court. 71
Premature as it may still be to conclude what the ultimate impact
will be of increased opting out on the securities class action, the
prospect at least is imaginable today that the securities class action may
be relegated to a secondary role: that of serving as a vehicle of last
resort for smaller retail investors. To be sure, opting out is only
economically viable when the individual claim exceeds some minimum
level, but that minimum level may also decline further as the procedures
for forming opt out coalitions become better established.
B.

Why Do Opt Outs Do Better?

Class counsel dispute whether opt outs invariably do better than
those who remain in the class, and the ratios by which the individual
recoveries paid to the opt outs exceeded their prorated share of the class
recovery may have been exaggerated in some cases. Nonetheless, opt
outs clearly seem to be doing better. What explains this pattern? At
least three basically legal reasons and two additional economic reasons
69 See Tyco International Ltd., WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2008, at A 14; see also Joseph
Distefano, New Jersey to Collect From, Pay Tyco, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May I, 2008, at C6.
70 This $73.3 million recovery represents over 2.2% of the $3 billion class action settlement.
Unless the New Jersey pension funds owned more than that percentage of Tyco's securities,
(which seems unlikely), they would appear to have received a larger recovery than their
proportionate share of the class action settlement (and thus to have outperformed the class action).
71 See Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000).
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can be plausibly offered to explain the superior performance of opt outs:
1.
a.

Legal Reasons

Escaping Federal Restraints

First, by opting out and suing in state court, plaintiffs can escape
obstacles that either uniquely apply to class actions or to securities
actions in federal court. The most obvious example is the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), whose provisions,
including its stay on discovery, its heightened pleading standards, and a
presumption in favor of cost shifting against the plaintiff, apply only in
federal court. Also, state "blue sky" statutes often do not require
plaintiffs to plead or prove scienter.
To prevent plaintiffs from escaping the PSLRA by simply shifting
their suits to state court, Congress passed the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA") in 1998, which did indeed stop the
migration of class actions from federal to state court. But SLUSA's
absolute bar applies only to class actions and consolidated proceedings
involving 50 or more plaintiffs. As long as institutions sue in smaller
groups, they avoid most of SLUSA's reach. The one exception to this
generalization is that SLUSA does broadly authorize the federal court to
stay discovery in a state court "upon a proper showing," even in a nonclass action. 72 This provision is not automatic (as the stay under the
PSLRA is), and some federal courts have read it conservatively. 73 Still,
SLUSA's stay of state court discovery is not a practical deterrent to opt
outs, because most class members opt out only after a settlement has
been reached in federal court (when the stay is no longer applicable).
Thus, the state court litigant who opts out of the federal class can
72 Section 21D(b)(3)(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(D)
authorizes a federal court as follows: "Upon a proper showing, a court may stay discovery
proceedings in any private action in a State court, as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action subject to a stay of discovery pursuant to this
paragraph." This provision is less automatic than the PSLRA's stay, which requires no special
showing.
73 The cases are divided as to when a stay should be granted of discovery in a state court
action that purports to be something other than a securities fraud action (for example, a derivative
action). For cases granting a stay of state court discovery, see Newby v. Enron Corp., 338 F.3d
467 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding stay under Section 21D(b)(3)(D) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 in case where state action was not a class action); Spears v. Metropolitan Life Ins., No.
2:07-cv-00088-RL-PRC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37004 (N.D. Ind. May 17, 2007) (granting stay
even where state action was for breach of fiduciary duty, not fraud); In re Cardinal Health, Inc.
Securities Litigation, 365 F. Supp. 2d 866 (S.D. Ohio 2006). For a case refusing to grant a stay
on the ground that the state court action had a different (non-fraud) focus, see City of Austin
Police Retirement System v. ITT Educational Services, No. 1:04-cv-0380-DFH-TAB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1646 (S.D. Ind. February 2, 2005).
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proceed to trial quickly in state court.
The PSLRA is not the only obstacle avoided by opting out and
suing in state court. Class action certification standards have been
significantly tightened across the spectrum of federal court litigation
over recent years, and, surprisingly, the most dramatic changes have
been in the area of securities class actions. 74 Once, securities class
actions were almost automatically certified, but more recently they have
been denied certification on a variety of grounds. These problems
disappear if an action is brought on a non-class basis in state court, and,
with no certification decision looming as a barrier, the time necessary to
reach the trial stage (and hence settlement) may be substantially
shortened.
Bringing the action as an individual action also simplifies the
problems associated with proving reliance. In federal court in a class
action, the plaintiffs can seek to rely on the "fraud on the market"
doctrine, but the circumstances under which that doctrine can be
invoked have narrowed, as courts are increasingly finding the market
not to be efficient in particular stocks, thereby rendering that doctrine
inapplicable. 75 But these problems drop out of the picture in a state
court trial of an individual action, as the plaintiff institution can simply
present evidence that its employees in fact relied upon the defendant's
public statements. Defendants may suspect that this testimony is selfserving and fabricated, but that is nearly impossible to prove.
b.

A More Favorable Forum

A second general category of reasons for the increase in opt outs
involves the likelihood that a state court may be a more attractive forum
for many institutions. Imagine that your client is a pension fund for the
public school teachers in a Midwestern state. In federal court, your
client would be submerged in a sea of institutions, but in state court the
plaintiff's attorneys can open their case by focusing the jury on poor
Mrs. Jones, the second grade school teacher for their children, who will
soon retire with a deflated pension because of the substantial losses
suffered on the defendant's stock. "Won't you help Mrs. Jones get her
pension back," they can ask, "by punishing those crooks from New
York?" In short, the case becomes more graphic and appealing. Not
only is there a decided home court advantage when a public pension
74 See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir.
2007); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007); In
re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
75 See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2005); Unger v.
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005).
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fund can sue in its own jurisdiction, but elected state judges are seldom
oblivious to the plaintiffs identity.
c.

Insolvency Constraints

A third (and possibly the most significant) reason is that the
settlement of opt out cases is seldom insolvency constrained. As a
practical matter, the defendant in the state court action cannot utilize its
limited solvency as a defense or threaten a bankruptcy filing. In
contrast, a "mega" securities class action in federal court may
hypothetically seek $5 billion in damages, and the defendants' strongest
argument may be that the corporation simply cannot pay such an
amount and would file for bankruptcy before doing so. Similarly, the
federal judge and/or a mediator may push for a settlement within a
"realistic" range. But, if instead an individual action is brought in state
court, the maximum damages will be much smaller. Few major
corporations can seriously threaten to tum to bankruptcy to avoid only a
$100 million claim. The success of opt outs thus illustrates the tyranny
of small decisions. No individual opt out is required to be "reasonable,"
but class counsel often can be compelled to moderate its demands.
2.

Economic Reasons
a.

Agency Costs

Opt outs may do better because they face greatly reduced agency
costs. Most obviously, each opt out selects its own counsel and can
monitor it closely, demanding at least as good a settlement as the other
opt outs receive. If unsatisfied, it can go to trial. An absentee class
member has no similar choice.
This is an inherent problem in the class action, because its
disparate members may have very different preferences, expectations,
and estimates. Even an ideally loyal class counsel cannot satisfy all
their preferences. In an individual action, agency costs can be reduced
by specially tailored compensation formulas. In particular, although the
plaintiffs attorney in a class action will likely be compensated on the
basis of a declining percentage of the recovery basis, which reduces its
incentive to hold out for a larger recovery, the plaintiffs attorney in the
individual action can negotiate its fee with its clients, and sometimes
even an increasing percentage of the recovery formula may be used.
Beyond this point, there is a further difficulty with the securities
class action. Essentially, it requires the class member to rely on two
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sets of agents: ( 1) the lead plaintiff, and (2) the class counsel. Each may
have its own misincentives. The lead plaintiff may be a public pension
fund whose elected state official needs to receive political campaign
contributions, or the official may prefer favorable publicity to
maximizing the monetary recovery. Even if the lead plaintiff has the
same incentives as more economically oriented investors, class counsel
may still possess substantial discretion, because pension funds often
have little in-house expertise in litigation tactics or strategy. In contrast,
the opt-out hires its own agent and is in a better position to monitor this
agent.
b.

Economic Leverage and Voting Power

Institutional investors typically hold significant voting power.
Suppose three large California pension funds opt out together, holding
collectively 6% of the firm's stock. They can vote this stock against
management or potentially team up with a Carl Icahn-style insurgent to
threaten management with ouster. Thus, management has reasons to
placate them that do not apply to smaller shareholders, and this can
translate into a higher settlement.
More generally, the large indexed institutional investor-such as a
CalPERS or a TIAA-CREF-is understood by management to be a
permanent presence in their corporate governance. Unlike non-indexed
investors, it is there for the duration and so must be dealt with.
Knowing this, the corporation has more reason to placate such a
shareholder. As a result, litigation often need not even be commenced
before a settlement is reached.

C.

Opts Out in Other Varieties of Class Actions

The relative success of opt outs in securities class litigation in
comparison to class members is hardly unique. In antitrust litigation,
large commercial buyers have recurrently opted out of the class and
sued in individual actions, sometimes combining to file a consolidated
complaint. Useful examples are provided by two major antitrust class
actions brought against Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. ("ADM"). In
1997, following its criminal conviction for price fixing, ADM reached a
civil settlement with class action plaintiffs in a suit alleging price-fixing
in the citric acid market under which ADM paid $86 million, but some
of the largest purchasers, including Proctor & Gamble, Quaker Oats,
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and the Kraft Foods unit of Philip Morris Cos. opted out.76 A year later,
ADM was forced to reveal that it had paid $36 million to four of these
opt out firms, and one careful study has estimated that the opt outs
received "from 2.0 to 3.5 times more damages (per dollar of citric acid
purchased) than did the settling class."77 Earlier, ADM also was
independently sued for price-fixing in the lysine acid market (lysine
acid being an amino acid used by food companies and feedlots to
promote quick growth in hogs and chickens). Again, it settled the class
action for $45 million (after paying a $70 million criminal fine to the
Department of Justice), but, again, some twenty-five large customers
opted out. 7s While the actual amounts paid to these opt outs is not
known, one study has estimated that they would receive "about $20
million"-again outperforming class members. 79
The ADM case is in no sense unique. In one of the largest antitrust
class actions, the major vitamin producers first pled guilty to antitrust
price fixing charges and then paid $1.17 billion in an antitrust class
action settlement. But again over 200 corporations, including large
firms such as Tyson Foods and Quaker Oats, chose to opt out of the
class of over 4,000 plaintiffs and sue individually. 80 These opt outs
were reported to account for over 70% of the class in terms of the
volume of their purchases.s 1 The likelihood is high that in opting out
these sophisticated plaintiffs made an intelligent decision about their
own best interests. Logically, one should assume that, when 70% of the
claims opt out, this was not a complete surprise to class counsel; rather,
both sides may have structured the class action as the vehicle for
compensating the residual and less sophisticated plaintiff.
In mass torts class action settlements, opting out is an even more
established pattern. Some 90,000 persons opted out of the diet drug (or
"Fen-Phen") settlement reached by Wyeth. 82 Characteristically, such
opt outs have higher than average value claims, and in mass tort cases,
the variation in claim value can be particularly great, based on the
highly variable physical injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. In mass

76 See P&G, Quaker Oats, United of Philip Morris Sue Archer-Daniels, WALL ST. J., June
11, 1997, at B15.
77 See John M. Connor, Archer-Daniel-Midland: Price-Fixer to the World 39 (Purdue Univ.
Dept. of Agric. Econ. Staff Paper 98-100, 1998).
78 See Thomas Burton, Several ADM Clients Won't Participate in a Proposed Price-Fixing
Settlement, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1996, at B2.
79 See O'Connor, supra note 77, at 38.
80 See Carlos Tejada, Some PlaintifJs Quit Settlements in Vitamin Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
2000, at BIO. For a discussion of the opt out procedures in this case, see In re: Vitamins Antitrust
Class Actions, 327 F.3d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The background of the case is more fully
discussed in In re: Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
81 See Tejada, supra note 80.
82 See Scott Hensley, Wyeth Says 90,000 Opt Out of 'Fen-Phen' Pact, WALL ST. J., May 16,
2003, at B4.
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torts, the class action tends to become the repository for plaintiffs whose
claims either have evidentiary, factual or legal problems that make it
undesirable for them to proceed on an individual basis or simply have
below average market value.
The same pattern then seems to prevail across a variety of contexts:
opt outs either hold higher value claims or have large claims, which
they are unwilling to entrust to a class counsel over whom they have
little control.

IV.

IMP LI CA TIONS

The dramatic disparity between the opt out recoveries and the class
recovery raises several basic questions: ( 1) When can institutional
investors be persuaded to remain in the class action?; (2) What can
defendants do to deter opting out (and how should courts respond to
these efforts)?; (3) At what point are institutional investors legally
obligated to opt out, rather than serve as a lead plaintiff?; and, finally,
(4) What does the increased rate of opt outs imply for the future of the
securities class action? This last question translates into a deeper issue
about equity. If defendants reduce their settlement offers to the class or
restructure the settlement terms to deal with large scale opt outs, will
small retail shareholders be made worse off by the fact that institutional
investors are increasing their recoveries? In effect, will the new trend
produce a zero-sum outcome in which institutions gain at the expense of
smaller retail investors who cannot flee the class action?
A.

When Can Institutions Be Persuaded to Stay in the Class?

Although events may be moving in the direction of a two-track
system in which institutions will opt out while smaller investors remain
in the class, the pattern is not uniform. Institutions did remain within
the Enron class. Possibly, this was based on their confidence in
William Lerach as their class counsel, or possibly it was based on the
absence of competing solicitations (as Enron did face serious legal
issues and was ultimately decertified-but not before settlements from
some of the defendants exceeded $7 billion, an all-time record).
Where, then, is the breakpoint below which opting out becomes
infeasible?
Mr. Lerach's former partner, Patrick Coughlin, has
estimated that opting out only makes sense when the claimed damages
exceed $1 billion. s3 But this estimate seems high. Over time, lower
83 See Lenckus, supra note 51.
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cost competitors will almost certainly surface within the plaintiffs bar
that are willing to undertake suit for opt out claimants with much
smaller losses. Hypothetically, if an opt out counsel could aggregate a
half-dozen claimants into a consolidated action in state court seeking,
say, $50 million in damages and could settle that case for, say, $20
million, it could charge a negotiated fee of 33 1/3% (or $6.67 million)
and still earn an acceptable return. No judicial approval of the fee is
required in such a consolidated action (as no class action is involved),
and this eliminates the inevitable uncertainty surrounding the fee award
that faces counsel in a federal court class action (where judicial
approval of both the settlement and the fee award is mandatory).
What will disincline an institution to opt out? Ironically, the factor
that may most deter opting out is the action's lack of merit. If the action
faces serious legal or factual problems, few institutions will likely want
to assert these claims on their own, both because of the prospective
reputational injury if the case is dismissed and the wasted investment of
time and money. Staying in the herd is not only safer and less costly,
but it may increase the chance of a favorable settlement, because the
greater size of the class may constitute a more potent threat. That is, a
defendant might rationally be willing to litigate individually with ten
different institutions, each suing on a $100 million claim in a different
forum, but feel compelled to settle a class action seeking $2 billion in
damages because an adverse outcome in the latter case would be
bankrupting.
Another motivation for staying in the class may be a differential in
the expected attorneys' fees. Because the opt out counsel is likely
spending the same approximate time on the case as the class action
counsel but is facing a smaller recovery, it will predictably seek to
charge a higher percentage fee. Also, in smaller cases, opt out counsel
may also want the institution to bear the out-of-pocket costs of the
litigation. Institutions that opt out will face other problems as well.
First, the institution can expect to be aggressively deposed by the
defendants. For some institutions (for example, hedge funds), there
could be a risk of embarrassment, or worse, if their own trading
activities were examined.
Defendants may even seek to assert
counterclaims in some cases against particular institutions (such as
hedge funds). In contrast, an institutional investor can hide in the crowd
in a class action and maintain its anonymity. Second, an institution that
opts out will probably also face a greater risk of a litigation defeat
because the defendants will not be as deterred from going to trial in a
smaller case as in a multi-billion dollar class action. The institution that
wants an assured recovery knows that few class actions ever go to trial.
Still, the bottom line is likely to be that there is little that class
counsel can do to keep the very large institution with losses above, say,
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$100 million in the class action. But competition between class and opt
out counsel does seem realistic for those institutions with losses of a
smaller magnitude. Not only will opting out require a higher fee, but it
exposes such an institution to adversarial tactics intended to harass and
to the possibility of an individual litigation defeat (which could focus
criticism on it that it would not incur if it remained within the class).
B.

What Can Defendants Do to Deter Opting Out?

To date, opt outs have largely occurred after a class action
settlement has been reached. Few institutions have opted out at the
outset, but rather have waited to see what proposed settlement emerged.
Only if it seemed inadequate would they then opt out in response. In
this light, an obvious strategy for defendants comes into focus: advance
the time of the opt out decision so that it must be made before any
settlement is reached. Once a settlement is proposed, opting out often
becomes a "no brainer" decision for the larger institution who views its
prorated share of the recovery as inadequate, but at an earlier stage
many institutions might be reluctant to incur costs when the class
settlement could potentially be attractive. Thus, if the defendants can
arrange for an early certification decision well before settlement
discussions have begun, two outcomes are possible: (1) they might
succeed and convince the court that the class cannot be certified; or (2)
failing that, they might still cause the institutions within the class to
permit the opt out period to expire without taking any action. The result
is to lock class members within the class and permit a less attractive
settlement to then be negotiated. In truth, class counsel might cooperate
in such a strategy with defendants because opt outs will also reduce its
fee (assuming that the settlement is reduced pro rata by the claims of the
opt outs).
More coercive tactics are also possible. Class counsel and defense
counsel could structure a settlement under which the class members
receive a priority over any individual recoveries. For example, if the
class action settles first (as is typical), the class members could be given
a security interest that makes them secured creditors and thus gives
them a priority in bankruptcy. Then, if the opt outs filed numerous
individual actions and the corporation did file for bankruptcy, the class
members would rank at the front of the line, whereas the individual opt
out claims would be at the rear end. Obviously, this tactic would be
used only when the combination of the class action and the individual
actions exposed the corporation to insolvency, but the beauty of this
approach is that the defendant corporation might never need to file for
bankruptcy. Potential opt outs would understand from the outset the

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

438

[Vol. 30:2

risk that they would stand behind the class action claimants in the
bankruptcy queue, and this might deter them from opting out.
The one tactic to discourage opt outs that has been litigated (and
upheld) involves adding a provision to the class action settlement
entitling the class members to an increase in their recovery if a higher
settlement is reached over a specified duration with any opt outs. 84
Effectively, such a provision pressures the defendants not to settle with
the opt outs on superior terms-by subjecting them to enormous
liability to the class, if they do. Such a "most favored nations" clause is,
however, risky because as a practical matter it forces defendants to go to
trial and risk greater exposure. Sometimes, such a provision may
arguably represent a collusive agreement among defendants not to settle
with opt outs, but at least it does not reduce the recovery to class
members.

C.

Does ERISA Compel the Institutional Investor to Opt Out?

A plausible case can be made that the institutional investor who
has the opportunity to opt out is under a legal obligation to do so.
ERISA's "exclusive benefit" standard requires the fiduciary of an
"employee benefit plan" to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for
the exclusive purpose of: ( 1) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries; and (2) defraying reasonable expenses of administering
the plan."85 Thus, this exclusive benefit rule means that it would be
inappropriate for a pension plan subject to ERISA to serve as a lead
plaintiff in a class action in order to benefit the other class members.
Such a public-spirited desire to lead the class and achieve a superior
settlement is an impermissible justification because it conflicts with the
fiduciary's obligation to act for the "exclusive benefit" of the pension
plan's participants and their beneficiaries, rather than for the interests of
other class members.
Of course, it may be impossible for the pension plan to find
counsel willing to undertake its case on a reasonable contingent fee
basis. Or, the fees sought by the opt out counsel may be higher than
that which class counsel would charge. Or, the pension plan may
appraise the risk of a litigation defeat or a costly counterclaim as being
unacceptably higher in the opt out case. All these reasons could easily
support a decision not to opt out. The limited case law under ERISA
84 See In re: Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26 (finding that opt outs lacked
standing to challenge this provision).
85 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(2000).
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has held that a fiduciary does not breach its duty to the pension fund by
failing to enforce a claim if the fiduciary reasonably believed that to do
so would be futile. 86
Legal risks might arise, however, if the real reason for the pension
plan's decision not to opt out were some personal benefit to its trustee
or directors, such as the receipt of "pay for play" political contributions
from class counsel. Obviously, this would violate ERISA's "exclusive
benefit" standard, if it were applicable. Still, public pension funds are
not subject to ERISA, which expressly excludes them. 87
Nonetheless, this exclusion of public pension funds from ERISA
may amount only to a distinction without an effective difference. In
1997, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Uniform Management of Public Employee
Retirement Systems Act (the "Act"), which is in the process of being
widely adopted. 88 The Act's provisions were modeled after ERISA,89
and it contains its own "exclusive benefit" rule. 90 Even where the Act
or other state statutes are not applicable, public pension fund fiduciaries
are still subject to the common law standards for fiduciaries, and these
standards are probably not significantly different. At a minimum, they
require that the trustee "use reasonable care and skill to preserve the
trust property."9 1 Spuming a probably higher recovery to stay in the
class and receive a settlement typically amounting to between 2% and
3% of your losses does not sound prudent, unless a specific reason is
given.
This scenario of potential liability for pension plan fiduciaries who
do not opt out probably becomes most plausible when (a) a plaintiffs
law firm solicits the pension plan to opt out and proposes competitive
terms, (b) other funds do opt out, and (c) the individual pension fund
documents no contemporaneous decision as to why it declined to opt

McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 110 (3rd Cir. 1986).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (excluding "governmental plans" from ERISA's coverage).
88 For an overview of this statute, written by the Reporter who drafted it, see Steven L.
Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems
Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141 (1998).
89 Id. at 145.
90 Section 7 of the Act requires a trustee or other fiduciary to "discharge duties with respect to
[the] retirement system: (I) solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries; (2) for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and paying reasonable
expenses of administering the system .... " See Unif. Mgmt. Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. Act § 7
(1997).
91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. c (2008) ("Prudent Investor Rule");
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Div. of Amax, 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981) (noting that under common
law and Restatement of Trusts, the "trustee bears an unwavering duty of complete loyalty to the
beneficiary of the trust"). Although the decision to sue (and by what means) may not be an
investment decision covered by the prudent investor rule, the trustee is also under a duty "to use
reasonable care and skill to preserve the trust property." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
176 (1959); Knight v. Comm'r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 788 (2008).
86 See, e.g.,

87
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out and can point to no factor or special consideration that it was relying
upon. Even then, the prospect of liability only becomes likely when
some personal benefit is received. This is rare in the case of private
pension funds, but possibly more common in union funds and public
pension funds.
D.

What Will Be the Impact of Increased Opting Out on the Class
Recovery?

Suppose in a class action that settles for $2 billion or more, 100
institutional investors opt out to sue in state court proceedings. By this
point, defense counsel will presumably have anticipated some level of
opt outs and attempted to address this issue in the settlement agreement.
Traditionally, the settlement agreement would contain a provision under
which defendants, at their option, could terminate the agreement if opt
outs exceeded a specified level (say 10%). But such a provision has
long been an empty threat, which has seldom, if ever, been exercised.
The problem with such a provision is that if the settlement agreement is
terminated, the class action goes forward to trial. Few corporate
defendants have the stomach for such an all or nothing gamble.
A more effective way to protect the corporation from opt outs
would be a provision that reduced the settlement amount in respect of
each opt out. But here, because the typical opt out recovers more than
the typical class member, the corporate defendant would need to set the
amount of the reduction at a level well above the amount that the opt
out would have received under the class action if the defendant is to be
held harmless. Thus, hypothetically, the class settlement amount might
be reduced, for example, by five times the amount that the opt outs
would have received under the settlement. Although such a tactic does
hold the corporation harmless, there is now a significant cost to opting
out that falls heavily on the smaller shareholders who remain behind
within the class. Such a tactic will not deter opting out, but it will shift
the cost of their gains to the remaining class members.
Of course, there are limits to the amount by which the class action
can be reduced to reflect opt outs. If the reduction is disproportionate
(and this is disclosed to the class), such a threatened reduction may
backfire by forcing the remaining institutional investors who would not
otherwise have opted out to do so. Also, to truly offset the amount that
the opt outs will likely receive in individual actions, the reduction might
have to be so disproportionate as to deplete and even exhaust the class
action settlement. For example, if 100 institutional investors who
collectively owned one third (or more) of the stock in the defendant
corporation were to opt out, they might recover (based on the
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experience to date) 20% to 40% of their actual losses in individual
actions, but today they would recover only 2% to 3% of their losses in
the typical securities class action settlement. If the total market losses
were $3 billion and the opt outs represented one third (or $1 billion) of
these losses, they could expect recoveries of between $200 million and
$400 million in individual actions. Yet, if the entire class today
typically settles for between 2% and 3% of their losses, the class
settlement fund would equal only $60 to $90 million, and the necessary
reduction to hold the defendant harmless would exceed the total value
of the settlement fund. Thus, the ability of defendants to protect
themselves from opt outs through disproportionate reductions of the
settlement fund seems limited. Although courts have yet to rule on this
issue, a settlement agreement that contains a disproportionate reduction
for opt outs (i.e., a reduction greater than their pro rata share of the class
recovery) stands in danger of being rejected as unfair.
Nonetheless, because there is a possibility that opt outs will reduce
the per share recovery to the remaining class members, the question
must be faced: Should opt outs be restricted on fairness grounds?
Should society be concerned that smaller investors might lose precisely
to the extent that institutional investors did better? Here, three different
lines of argument need to be considered:
First, principles of distributive justice may lead one to disfavor
significant variations in the actual recovery that shareholders receive,
but it is far from clear that such principles, or even cruder egalitarian
biases, necessarily should lead one to oppose allowing institutions to opt
out from the class. Even if such opt outs adversely affect the investors
who remain in the class, these smaller investors in the class are still
typically wealthy and diversified. In contrast, the beneficiaries of
pension plans (and particularly public pension plans, which have been
the most frequent opt outs) are characteristically poorer and dependent
on their pensions for retirement income. Thus, if public policy is to be
guided by a Rawlsian desire to favor the worst off, individual investors
do not merit any preference over pensioners (or the beneficiaries of
other institutional investors).
Second, even if opt outs injure the residual class members in the
short-run, they may benefit them in the long-run. Over the long-run,
increased opting out will place class counsel under increased
competitive pressure to improve the class settlement. Faced with
competition and a risk that a "cheap" settlement will produce a high rate
of opt outs, class counsel must seek to reach a superior settlement in
order to avoid the fee reduction that follows from a smaller class size
caused by increased opt outs.
Third, opt outs should reduce the individual class member's
recovery only when defendants negotiate disproportionate reductions to
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reflect the opt outs. Arguably, the simpler means of protecting the class
is to limit the reduction of the class recovery to an amount proportionate
to the opt outs' claims.
If one takes an optimistic perspective on contemporary
developments, class counsel seems likely to be held accountable by
active competition.
To date, effective competition among the
contenders for class counsel has largely been lacking. Although
plaintiffs law firms certainly do compete to secure the lead plaintiff
designation, their battles usually do little for shareholders because they
do not compete in terms of price or performance. Not infrequently,
their competition serves only to increase the campaign offers of some
elected public officials. As a practical matter today, three plaintiffs'
firms dominate the securities class action industry: Bernstein, Litowitz,
Berger & Grossmann; Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins; and
Grant & Eisenhofer. Other firms are active, but they seldom can
command the institutional base necessary to secure lead plaintiff status
in a large case. Still, with increased opting out, newer and smaller
entrants can enter the field to represent opt outs. Symptomatically,
counsel for many of the opt outs in the Qwest case was Entwistle &
Cappucci, a younger, smaller, and innovative firm, but not a firm in the
top rank (by size or revenues) of the plaintiffs' bar.
A final question involves whether any policy measures could truly
diminish the growing rate of opt outs. Defendants might prefer a
mandatory class action from which opting out would not be permitted.
But in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 92 the Supreme Court made clear that
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not countenance
restrictions on opting out, and some federal courts have subsequently
found the right to opt out from a class action for money damages to be
of constitutional stature. 93 If so, what alternative measures are feasible?
Probably the most effective and feasible measure would be to give the
JPML the power to consolidate state court individual actions with the
federal class action for purposes of pretrial discovery. Modest as this
step might sound, if the opt out were thus compelled to stay in the
consolidated proceeding, the incentive to opt out would be reduced.
Although the court handling the consolidated proceeding would be
ultimately required to relinquish control of the individual actions (as the
Supreme Court ruled in its Lexecon decision),94 "ultimately" can be a
long time, and attempts to escape the transferee court have often been
unsuccessful. 95

92 527 U.S. 815 (1999).

93

See cases discussed supra note 23.
See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
95 See, e.g., In re Carbon Dioxide Indus. Antitrust Litig., 229 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2000);
Altamont Pharmacy, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 94-c-6282, 2002 WL 69495 (N.D. Ill.). These
94
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The Class Action Fairness Act has already taken us well down the
road towards federalizing tort law,96 and extending the power of the
JPML so as to lock opt outs into federal court would only represent a
marginal further step down this road. This essay is by no means
recommending such a step, but, sooner or later, defendants will wake up
to this possibility and begin lobbying.

E.

What Should Courts Do?

If one believes that competition is desirable and that opt outs
encourage it, several policy recommendations follow:
(1) Courts should not certify the class action (or, at least, permit
the period for opt outs to expire) before the settlement's terms have
been publicly disclosed. This would give those who are dissatisfied an
opportunity to flee the class and pressure class counsel to satisfy its
clients;
(2) Courts should reject proposed settlements that have
disproportionate reductions for opt outs. Still, courts need not reject
settlements that give the class the benefit of any higher payment made
to an opt out. This would prevent discrimination in favor of the opt outs
if the defendants are willing to take the risky step of binding their hands
in this fashion.
(3) Where the opt out rate is significant, this fact is itself material
to the shareholders and should be disclosed to them (with possibly an
additional opt out period granted for them to reconsider).
These are modest proposals and largely consist of procedures that
courts are already authorized to follow. In truth, the basic proposal
made herein is to let the market work.

CONCLUSION

Accountability requires competition, and competition appears to be
coming. How much competition results will depend on the still
unknown breakpoint at which opt out claims become economically
cases are extremely fact specific, and no attempt will be made to describe them. Rather, the point
is that the transferee court wants a global settlement and tends to see opt outs as an obstacle to
that goal.
96 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5, greatly restricts
plaintiffs' ability to file a multi-state class action in state court in response to the perception that
"rotten boroughs" existed in which plaintiffs could find friendly judges. See, e.g., Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class
Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006). No one yet has suggested that opt outs
are also motivated by a similar desire to access "friendly" or partisan state court judges.
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viable. If, through coordination, investors with claims worth, say, $25
million each (and maybe $100 million in the aggregate) could afford to
opt out and sue in a consolidated proceeding, then the class action will
face large scale depletion. If the breakpoint is as high as $1 billion, opt
outs will have less impact, but will still encourage some increased
competition as smaller firms enter the field by representing opt outs.
All this sounds like good news for investors-except for one final
complication. Securities class actions face a circularity problem; in
reality, investors are paid by investors, and often the result is a pocketshifting wealth transfer among the same diversified investors.9 7
Subtract from these wealth transfers the high transaction costs of
litigation, and investors appear systematically to lose. That result does
not change because actions are brought as individual actions rather than
as class actions. Indeed, a higher rate of opt outs may even compound
the injury, as the damages imposed on the corporation (and its
shareholders) should grow.
Thus, even if agency costs are reduced, an optimal outcome is not
necessarily reached. Increased exit is not then a panacea for all the
problems of the securities class action, but no "magic bullet" can solve
all these problems. Other things being equal, it is desirable to reduce
agency costs (as greater competition should do). Other reforms may
also be needed to shift liability, at least marginally, away from investors
and onto responsible corporate officers and agents. Still, the need for
such additional reforms does not supply an argument for preserving the
current system in which attorneys, as agents, are only weakly
accountable to their clients.
Ultimately, whether one likes it or not, competition is coming.

97

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

